Purchaser-Provider Partnerships In The Public Service: Oh No, Not a New 4Ps for Business Networks! by Steffens, Paul R. et al.
  
 
   COVER SHEET 
 
 
Steffens, P. and Matthews, J. and Wollin, A. and Duffield, B. and Wisseman, A. (1998) Purchaser-
Provider Partnerships In The Public Service: Oh No, Not a New 4Ps for Business Networks! 
In Proceedings Australia & New Zealand Marketing Academy Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand.
 
 
Accessed from  http://eprints.qut.edu.au
 
 
Copyright 1998 the authors.  
Ref:______________ 
                                                                                                                                                         (office use only)                 
Theme: [IMP – connections between firms in networks] 
 
PURCHASER-PROVIDER PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: 
OH NO, NOT A NEW 4PS FOR BUSINESS NETWORKS! 
 
 
 
Paul Steffens, Judy Matthews, Drew Wollin and Art Shulman 
University of Queensland 
 
Bea Duffield and Arnold Wissemann 
Queensland Department of Primary Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for all correspondence: 
 
Dr Paul Steffens 
 
Graduate School of Management 
The University of Queensland 
Brisbane Qld 4072 
Australia 
 
Phone: +61 7 3365 6610 
Fax: +61 7 3365 6988 
 
Email: p.steffens@gsm.uq.edu.au 
 
 
 
Ref:______________ 
                                                                                                                                                         (office use only)                 
 1
PURCHASER-PROVIDER PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: 
OH NO, NOT A NEW 4PS FOR BUSINESS NETWORKS! 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper describes the initial establishment of a business-to-business network in 
a novel context – within and around a government department as it implements 
Purchaser-Provider relationships. A popular reform in public sector management 
over recent years has been the establishment of internal competition to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness under a “Purchaser-Provider” model. We applied the 
International and Industrial Marketing Purchasing (IMP) framework to capture 
some of the major transitions occurring within and around this organisation. We 
found the IMP approach useful for capturing the dynamic emerging structures.  
Just like relationships in private-sector business, Purchaser-Provider tends to 
operate as a network, with a mix of cooperation and competition, rather than 
competition alone.  The public-sector context is unusual in that the network has 
been established by moving from an administrative control structure, cooperation 
alone, rather than from an open market, with competition alone. Implications for 
further research are raised. 
 
Keywords: [Business Networks; Purchaser-Provider; Competition] 
 
1 Introduction 
The International and IndustrialMarketing Purchasing (IMP) group has promoted 
the “network perspective” of markets to describe how businesses actually operate 
(Axelsson and Easton 1992; Hakansson 1982; Hakansson 1987; Hakansson and 
Johanson 1992; Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Moller and Wilson 1995). To date, 
the focus of this literature has been concentrated on the private sector. This paper 
extends the use of the IMP perspective by applying it to the formation of a 
business network in a novel context: a government research and service 
department and the industry in which it participates. Prior IMP case studies have 
illustrated companies moving towards increased cooperation in a competitive 
environment. This case study shows a government department introducing 
competitive practices into bureaucratic cooperative arrangements. By examining 
such an atypical case, we wish to make visible some of the implicit assumptions 
that may have been made in other contexts. As such, this case provides a useful 
site for developing and testing the ideas of business networks. 
The case of study is the Queensland Department of Primary Industries (QDPI) 
during its initial implementation of “Purchaser-Provider”.  Purchaser-Provider is a 
public sector reform designed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
government departments. It essentially separates the “purchaser” part of the 
department from the “provider” of public services (or goods), thereby introducing 
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some internal competition (FitzGerald et al. 1996). The implementation of a 
Purchaser-Provider based structure in QDPI commenced in August 1997. 
In this paper we briefly describe: the theoretical basis of the project, the context 
and site of the research, the broad methodology being used, some preliminary 
findings and emerging theoretical issues that warrant further investigation. 
2 Context: The Purchaser Provider Initiative in Qdpi 
QDPI commenced a progressive structural reorganisation, based on “Purchaser-
Provider”, in mid 1997. This section provides the context for this study by 
discussing both Purchaser-Provider and its implementation within QDPI. 
Commonwealth and State governments in Australia have been seeking to improve 
public-sector management systems in the last ten to fifteen years. An increasingly 
popular strategy has been to introduce elements of a market through a Purchaser-
Provider structure (FitzGerald et al. 1996). Theoretically, the Purchaser-Provider 
model separates the purchaser function from the provider function in an attempt to 
achieve tighter targeting of clients and outcomes, improved accountability and 
transparency, and improved efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of 
services. 
QDPI is a rural economic development agency bringing together the Queensland 
government and industry in partnership to increase the viability and profitability 
of primary industries on a sustainable basis. The Department’s primary activities 
focus on research, development and extension (RD&E), information services and 
regulatory functions. These are essential to primary producers seeking to increase 
the competitiveness, efficiency and profitability of their enterprises. The 
Department’s responsibilities focus on agriculture, forestry and fisheries, with a 
budget of $350 million and a workforce of 4000 staff, with 74% located outside 
central Brisbane. QDPI’s vision is to have a self-reliant primary industries sector 
confidently competing in a world market place. 
The essence of QDPI’s new Purchaser-Provider structure is shown in Figure 1. 
The first step to Purchaser-Provider is the separation of purchasers and providers. 
A statewide network of industry-focused institutes was established to act as 
providers of RD&E services for QDPI. Simultaneously, Sub-Programs were 
established to act as purchasers of RD&E (and other) services. 
The role of the purchaser Sub-Programs is a policy role, to set priorities for 
industry development and ultimately to decide what RD&E services should be 
purchased. Given the role of QDPI to enhance the sustainable economic position 
of rural industries, the above priorities are decided in partnership with industry 
through industry development councils (IDCs). “A modus operandi for DPI’s 
investment in economic development is the purchaser/provider 
partnership”(Duffield 1997, p3). 
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Figure 1: QDPI Purchaser-Provider Network 
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Each institute is controlled by a director and a board that is comprised mostly of 
industry representatives. These institutes perform services for the purchasers 
under a “memorandum of understanding”. Under this negotiated agreement, 
deliverable outcomes from the institute’s RD&E activities are specified against 
funding. Institutes are also free to seek funds from external bodies, most notably 
Commonwealth research and development corporations and directly from 
industry. 
3 Theoretical Perspectives: Administrative, Market or Network Control 
Purchaser-Provider seems loosely based on neo-classical economics, with an 
ideology of the supremacy of open markets, and less explicitly on transaction cost 
economics. Transaction cost economics suggests that the two competing methods 
of organising business activities are market (competitive) control and 
administrative (cooperative) control (Williamson 1975). QDPI formerly operated 
under administrative control, whereas Purchaser-Provider represents a move 
toward market control by introducing an internal market.  Against the prevailing 
approach from economics and public policy, we look to the emerging area of 
business network theory. It recognises that these relationships are characterised by 
market (competitive) control and administrative (cooperative) control 
mechanisms, rather than one or the other as suggested by conventional approaches 
(Thorelli 1986). 
Business network theory also introduces a number of concepts to capture the 
complex and dynamic nature of the relationships between the multiple purchasers, 
providers and other stakeholders that characterise the reality of QDPI’s evolving 
business environment. A potential contribution of business network theory in this 
context is to provide an analytical set of lenses for describing how businesses 
actually operate, as opposed to the normative or prescriptive approach of neo-
classical economics, which is more often concerned with how businesses and 
markets should operate. We outline these three theoretical positions below. 
3.1 Administrative control: The way things were 
The former management arrangements within QDPI can be considered from the 
perspective of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975). Transaction costs 
are the costs of negotiating, monitoring and controlling a transaction between a 
service provider and a purchaser. The former management arrangements may be 
characterised as administrative control, where managers, including the Minister, 
decide on action, without the formal definition or separation of purchaser and 
provider. Under administrative control transaction costs may be minimised by 
using rules, procedures and a single, hierarchical authority system, as should exist 
in any “professional” or “machine bureaucracy” structure (Mintzberg 1979). 
3.2 Purchaser-provider: An ideology of market control 
The contrasting approach is to use market control to minimise transaction costs. 
The organisation needing a service negotiates and then contracts with another 
organisation to provide the service. Market control relies on prices and 
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competition to minimise transaction costs. The Purchaser-Provider model 
represents a form of market control using either or both internal and external 
markets. With an external market, the purchaser contracts with external providers 
in an open competitive market. In an internal market the functions of purchaser 
and provider are separated within the one organisation, with the purchaser then 
contracting with the provider for the provision of services (Duffield 1997, 
FitzGerald et al. 1996). 
A number of potential benefits of the Purchaser-Provider model have been 
identified (Resource Management Improvement Branch 1995, FitzGerald et al. 
1996). These benefits include better working relationships between purchasers 
and providers through the clarification of requirements and responsibilities, and 
fewer conflicts of interest. Enhanced contestability and competition result, 
especially when using an external market and accountability. Increased 
transparency is also achieved through the formal and open specification and 
reporting of activities. The contracting process has also been found to assist both 
purchaser and provider in prioritising their activities. Increased managerial 
autonomy of the purchaser through specification of the desired outcomes of 
contracts, and improved client responsiveness through client participation in 
framing of contracts and monitoring of performance, have also been noted. 
However, the Purchaser-Provider model is not without its problems and critics 
(Resource Management Improvement Branch 1995), although ignored by some 
promoters of the Purchaser-Provider model, such as FitzGerald et al. (1996). 
Contracts may be too general or too flexible, and transaction and compliance costs 
may be significant, in terms of additional management and administrative 
requirements. This is particularly true in the context of R&D, where the paths for 
achieving outcomes, or the outcomes themselves, are difficult to specify in 
advance. Also, the formal contracting process may reduce communication and 
coordination by reducing the level of integration and feedback between 
purchaser(s) and provider(s). Other concerns are that the purchasers may lose in-
house expertise to generate and monitor contracts, as much of the expertise 
resides in providers. Also, the introduction of yet more management and structural 
changes may further disrupt and demoralise staff already battle-weary from a 
decade of so-called public-sector reforms. 
Such problems represent transaction costs and are not unexpected for those 
familiar with business (as opposed to public administration), as they represent 
many of the issues in the classic “make or buy” decision.  Just as business 
network theory represents another view for the operation of real-world markets 
and the relationships between businesses, it may provide a useful perspective on 
relationships in a public sector setting. 
3.3 Purchaser-provider partnerships: The reality of network control 
Business network theory provides a third perspective and offers concepts that may 
be used to overcome some of the potential problems both in design and 
implementation of Purchaser-Provider arrangements. Networks explicitly 
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recognise the coexistence of both competition (market control) and cooperation 
(administrative control) (Thorelli 1986). Network theory portrays organisations as 
actors within a complex array of long-term, though dynamic, relationships or 
partnerships. These relationships may be vertical, such as between purchaser, 
provider and end-user; or horizontal, such as between different providers. 
The work of the IMP group (Hakansson 1982, 1987, 1989, Axelsson and Easton 
1992, Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Moller and Wilson 1995) has refined and 
extended the network approach through a focus on business networks and 
exchange relationships (Figure 2). Exchange relationships are business 
relationships between autonomous business units built from a history of exchange 
episodes. Four key elements of exchange are product or service, information, 
financial exchange and social exchange. 
Business relationships can be seen as having different substance as well as 
different functions (Hakansson and Snehota 1995, p.26). The substance of 
relationships is viewed as having three different layers – actor bonds, resource ties 
and activity links – which characterise the relationship between the companies. 
The activity layer refers to the technical, administrative, commercial and other 
activities that connect internal activities of the two actors. The resource layer 
describes ties that connect the various resource elements (technical, material, 
knowledge resources and other intangibles) of two companies. In the actor layer, 
the actors become connected and bonds are developed that affect how the actors 
perceive, evaluate and treat each other. 
Relationships may be further characterised by varying levels of cooperation, 
commitment and trust, which affect the nature of negotiation and importantly, the 
flexibility of working transactional arrangements (Wilson and Moller 1995; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994; Steffens, Wilson and O’Keeffe 1997). Unlike 
administrative or market control, network theory suggests that control systems are 
emergent: they take time to evolve, are path dependent and are non-deterministic 
(Hakansson and Henders 1995). 
In the context of economic and technological development, the core business of 
QDPI, networks and external relationships are central to improved outcomes 
(Hakansson 1989; Huang, Steffens and Schroder 1997). Further, active networks 
are a key to leveraging intellect, a core resource in technology development. The 
network perspective and the focus on business relationships use the notion of 
companies or organisations as actors, not just individuals, in the sense that 
companies act purposefully. This perspective offers new understandings for the 
QDPI Purchaser-Provider implementation, where each unit of the department can 
be viewed as an actor. 
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Figure 2: IMP Network Model 
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5 The Story So Far 
The study to date has documented the initial implementation of Purchase-Provider 
at QDPI, and has observed some of the dynamics of the changing relationships. 
5.1 Making it work: A network of relationships 
While some competitive forces are at work within the new QDPI structure, it is 
clear from our research to date that cooperation and partnerships are a stronger 
driving force.  From the outset, QDPI recognised the importance of cooperative 
relationships within their new structure: “The Purchaser-provider relationship 
must be viewed as a partnership operating under “win-win” principles” (Duffield 
1997, p. 4), and is reflected within our interviews. 
“The trend these days is strategic alliances, vertically and horizontally, and 
that's what I see this as being.  And if everybody takes it that way, it works 
well.  If you take it, on the other hand, that it's a pure contractor 
relationships, where they are setting the rules, then you say, why have an 
institute board, it's a waste of money, because they're organising all of that 
and all we do is deliver what they ask us to do.” 
“The new structure of delivery may lead to breaking down the silos within 
the department. An example might be working with the export group… we 
should all be operating in rural business industry services… Really we 
should have 10 targets which are all working together and so you really 
need to coordinate bringing us all together to do that.  So we're starting to 
do that a little better than we have.”   
5.2 Actor bonds 
The research revealed many dimensions of actor bonds within the overall 
network.  
Interviews consistently suggested that the Purchaser-Provider relationships 
between sub-programs and institutes are close in nature. 
“It (providing services) is all done jointly, and they come up with their 
targets in consultation with us and we have a lot of input.  I see it as a 
partnership; it's not a contractor type relationship.” 
The importance of personal relationships (social bonds) between actors was 
another clear theme that emerged from interviews. 
“My relationship with the directors is that I try to work hard on the 
personal relationships.” 
“…and those sorts of relationships, you often exchange an awful lot of 
information very quickly about what's happening, and I really value that.” 
“I want to find out what really makes these sorts of relationships work and 
not work; and when they're not working, we're not learning.” 
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The relationship of the institutes to QDPI and the issue of future independence 
from QDPI and its potential for new relationships is interpreted in different ways. 
“Where I think independence will come from will be in their ability to 
manage their complex relationships inside and outside the organisation, 
and in what they can gain from those relationships.” 
“It's more about the informal relationships and the way dollars flow and the 
way priorities flow.” 
The importance of relationships is not limited to the purchaser provider interface. 
“We try to have relationships with all of these people, vertically and 
horizontally and all the rest of it…  So there are inter-relationships at all 
levels, and you've got to have them to make it work.” “And particularly if 
we're chasing business outside, there will be all sorts of groups that we 
might decide to have an alliance with.” 
Interlocking directorates with staff in multiple roles encouraged discussion of 
ideas at all levels.   
“Our (Institute Board) chairman is on the Industry Development Council .” 
5.3 Activity links 
Activity links are particularly important for technological development, which 
includes “adaptation of development direction and target specifications, and 
division of labour in R&D through joint development projects.” (Laage-Hellman 
1997, p.21).  These activity links are some of the institutes’ staff and Board 
members’ suggestions regarding new directions for delivery of RDE. 
Improving activity links within the QDPI. One of the emerging changes is the 
better relationships between the Institute and other sections of QDPI. 
“I think, if anything, they're bringing them closer together, because there's 
always been a divide between research and some of these other things.  In 
fact one of the good things that's happened is that some of the marketers out 
of rural industry business services have now been aligned to institutes.” 
Activity links have been established with other institutes that are threatened by the 
onset of a new pest or plant disease. 
Renegotiation of relationships with other providers includes moving from 
contractual provision to collaborative processes to identify common goals and 
purposes. 
“So, again, it's a joint venture type arrangement (with other Providers) that 
we should be looking at, not a contractual arrangement.  If they paid the full 
cost of a project, then I'm quite happy for them to put whatever conditions 
upon it they wish.  But while they're only contributing 20% or 30%, which is 
the norm, then it should be a joint venture arrangement.” 
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5.4 Resource ties 
Strong resource ties exist within the QDPI network. The most obvious is the 
common “corporate support” across the entire department. This includes common 
information systems, accounting systems, legal services, HR services, RD&E 
policy advice, export development, and rural industry business services. These 
resources are shared by all internal QDPI actors. This has a variety of 
consequences, including Staff movements and implementing software to facilitate 
activity links. Strong physical resource ties also exist horizontally between 
institutes. It is not uncommon for institutes to share sites and equipment. This 
facilitates the potential for horizontal activity links between institutes. However, 
shared resources can inhibit the independence of institutes. With regard to the 
independence/interdependence of ties, one of the most important issues that has 
emerged from the new structural arrangements is corporate identity – in 
particular, the degree to which institutes establish a separate legal and/or market-
based identity. Several important resource elements of corporate identity are the 
use of the QDPI name and its logo, and ownership of intellectual property. This 
resource tie has been an important factor shaping the relationship between 
institutes and sub-programs. More importantly, corporate identity influences the 
relationship between institutes and industry groups, since it is crucial in shaping 
the external perceptions of institutes. This provides an example of resource tie 
between two actors (institute and sub-program), influencing the relationship 
between third parties (industry groups). 
5.5 A different path to a business network: Introducing competition to a 
cooperative, administrative structure 
One of the observations that makes this case interesting from a network 
perspective is that the network (a mix of cooperation and competition between 
actors within the market) has emerged from a cooperative administrative 
structure, rather than from a competitive market structure. 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the new QDPI structure is driven 
more by cooperation and partnership than by competition. This is not surprising. 
In traditional business networks, cooperation, adaptations, trust and commitment 
between actors develops slowly over time (Wilson and Moller 1995; Ford et al. 
1998, 25-30). In the current application, it is not unexpected that competition is 
slow to develop. The former cooperative relationships will clearly inhibit the shift 
to competition. It will be interesting to see how far the structure ultimately shifts 
towards competition. 
In QDPI’s case, the pre-existing administrative structure was characterised by 
strong actor bonds (with high levels of goal compatibility, social exchange and 
bonding and trust), activity links and resource ties. In some ways, institutes are 
trying to weaken the previous actor bonds (both vertically with sub-programs, and 
horizontally with institutes) as they seek to establish a new level of independence 
from QDPI and to be open to developing new activity links and resource ties. As 
discussed above, many existing resource ties and activity links are acting to 
inhibit this process. 
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To trace the evolution of these organisations, we will continue to follow the 
development of the network structure at QDPI using the analytic framework of 
business relationships by examining actor bonds, activity links and resource ties. 
During our next phase of research, we will be developing indices of 
accountability, transparency and effectiveness of services with which these 
emerging innovations in Actor Bonds, Activity Links and Resource Ties can be 
evaluated. 
6 Conclusions 
Purchaser-Provider structures have been introduced via RD&E institutes in QDPI 
as a means of introducing competition and increasing accountability and 
transparency in the delivery of services. Our analysis suggests that a network 
approach with its focus on relationships, in contrast to a sole focus on 
administration or competitive control, provides a useful set of constructs and 
dimensions for describing and analysing the ongoing restructuring under the 
Purchaser-Provider model. 
The formation of the ensuing network structure and the changing relationships of 
actors to each other evolve from introducing competition to a cooperative 
administrative structure. This is in stark contrast to normal business networks that 
evolve from introducing cooperation to a competitive market structure. 
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